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But it is also probable that in the future there will be a move-
ment towards declaring disclaimers in particular fields invalid as
contrary to public policy. Then it is possible too for legislatures
to adopt a policy of imposing additional statutory obligations
wherever it is feasible and deemed necessary for the protection
of a wide class of buyers. It is true that present usages indicate
a limited sphere for the operation of these protective measures,
but there is nothing which confines these trends to their present
bounds. These weapons of the legislature should prove sufficient
to withstand any combined threat on the part of vendors through-
out the country to re-establish the doctrine of caveat emptor.
J. RoBEaT GOTClE.
THE FAIR TRADE ACTS-THE LATEST ATTACK ON THE
LOSS LEADER PROBLEM
The loss leader system is a business scheme whereby a widely
advertised product of standard quality and popular demand is
sold at little or no profit as an inducement to the customer to
enter the store., The loss leader problem has been an outgrowth
of modern marketing. Although it represents only a segment of
the larger problem of price cutting, it has been the subject of a
flood of controversy. 2 The theory is that the impression of low
prices created by offering the leader at a low price will induce
the customer to buy other goods which yield a large profit to the
retailer.3 The result of this plan, so the proponents of resale
price maintenance argue, is a detriment to the interests of other
distributors, to the producer and to the general public.4 It is
asserted to be a detriment to the retailers because it results in
1. Copeland, Resale Price Maintenance, 13 Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (1932) 326; Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Mainte-
nance (1932) part one.
2. The chief arguments against resale price maintenance are put forth
in Note, 19 Col. Law Rev. 265 (1919). See also 28 Adv. and Sell. 29-30(Dec. 17, 1936). The contrary opinion is expressed in Miller, The Mainte-
nance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 22; 178
Printers Ink 100-2 (1937); 40 Sales Management 400 (March 1, 1937). A
comparison of the arguments pro and con may be found in Note, 36 Col. L.
Rev. 293 (1936), and Oppenheim, Cases on Trade Regulation (1936) 834 et
seq.; Note, 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 267 (1936).
3. Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932) c. 7.
4. Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 22; Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade (1913)
27 Harv. L. Rev. 139; Federal Trade Commission, Report on Retail Price
Maintenance (1931).
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cut-throat competition2 Its effect on the producer is said to be
a loss of retailers and hence a restricted distribution ;c its effect
on the public, although less direct, is claimed to be undesirable
because the system leads to an emphasis on price, rather than
on the quality of the merchandise7 This note will treat the prac-
tical effect of the various resale price maintenance devices that
have been attempted, including the most recent device, the Fair
Trade Acts.
I.
The earliest cases allowing resale price maintenance were not
based upon contract but upon notice attached to patented and
copyrighted articles." The theory underlying these decisions was
that the exclusive right to produce included also the right to fix
the resale price of the patented or copyrighted article by notice
to the dealer. As a result, if the price fixed by the owner of the
patent or copyright was not maintained, he was given a right
of action against the price cutter, not for breach of contract, but
for an infringement of his patent or copyright2 This principle,
however, was not extended so as to allow the owner of trade-
marked goods to control the resale price merely because of the
trade-mark. This right of action, moreover, existed solely in the
person owning the copyright or patent. 0 However, in subsequent
decision the courts refused to follow these early holdings. Thus,
in 1908 in Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus the Supreme Court
of the United States refused to permit the publisher of a copy-
righted book to compel the maintenance of the resale price of the
book by virtue of the copyright law;", and in 1913 in Bauer v.
O'Donnell the same court in effect overruled the cases involving
patented articles. 12 Thus, contrary to the early cases, the doc-
5. 40 Sales Management 202-2 (Feb. 1, 1937).
6. Seligman and Love, Piice Cutting and Piice Maintenance (1932).
7. Ibid.
8. Heaton-Penninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 6, 1896) ; Edison v. Kaufmann, 105 Fed. 960 (C. C. W. D.,
Penn. 1901) ; Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 22 S. Ct. 747,
46 L. ed. 1058 (1902); Straus v. American Publishers' Ass., 177 N. Y. 473,
69 N. E. 1107, 64 L. R. A. 701, 101 Am. St. Rep. 819 (1904).
9. Edison v. Pike, 116 Fed. 960 (C. C. Mass., 1902).
10. Ingersoll v. McColl, 204 Fed. 147 (D. C. Minn., 1913) ; Garst v. Hall,
179 Mass. 588, 61 N. E. 219, 55 L. R. A. 631 (1901); see also Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (C. C. Mass., 1906); Garst
v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174 (1900).
11. 210 U. S. 339, 28 S. Ct. 722, 52 L. ed. 1086 (1908) ; see also Scribner
v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 28 S. Ct. 735, 52 L. ed. 1094 (1908).
12. 229 U. S. 1, 33 S. Ct. 616, 57 L. ed. 1041 (1913); see also United
States v. A. Schrader's Son, 264 Fed. 175 (D. C. N. D. Ohio, 1919) ; Victor
Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (C. C. A. N. J., 1921).
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trine arose that after a patented or copyrighted article had been
sold by the producer he could no longer, simply because of his
monopoly, 13 fix the resale price by notice.
At common law the courts uniformly upheld contracts between
the manufacturer and the dealer to maintain resale prices, pro-
vided that the contracts did not constitute an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.1 4 Such contracts were generally upheld even
after the enactment of the federal and state anti-trust laws.15
The manufacturer in those instances was given a remedy for
breach of the contract by an action for damages. 6 Equitable re-
lief was given him by injunction.' 7 However, he had no remedy
as against one not in privity of contract'8 save the usual action
that the manufacturer was the beneficiary of the contract.
Moreover, in D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker20 the court allowed
the manufacturer to sue for breach of a price maintenance con-
tract entered into between a jobber and retailer on the theory
that the manufacturer was the beneficiary of the contract.
In 1911, however, the Supreme Court of the United States in
the leading case of Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Park and Sons
Company 1 declared such contracts invalid under the Sherman
Anti-trust Act in so far as they affected goods in interstate com-
merce. A strong dissent was voiced by Mr. Justice Holmes who
wrote:
13. Moreover, the law is well settled that after the sale of the patented
or copyrighted article the validity of the contract of sale is to be con-
sidered as if there were no monopoly. United States v. Kellogg, 222 Fed.
725 (D. C. Mich., 1915).
14. Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88, 9 S. Ct. 658, 33 L. ed. 67 (1889); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. Goldthwaithe, 133 Fed. 794 (C. C. Mass., 1904); that
resale price maintenance contracts are generally upheld in most foreign
countries see Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 22.
15. Seligman and Love, Pyice Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932) 51;
Munter v. Eastman Kodak Co., 28 Cal. App. 660, 153 Pac. 737 (1915) ; Com.
v. Grinstead, 111 Ky. 203, 63 S. W. 427, 56 L. R. A. 709 (1901); Walsh v.
Dwight, 58 N. Y. Supp. 91 (1899); In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104 (C. C. Ohio,
1892).
16. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144,
51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522 (1913); Garst v. Harris, 187 Mass. 72, 58 N. E.
154 (1908).
17. Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)
395; D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041 (1912).
18. Ford Motor Co. v. International Automobile League, 209 Fed. 235
(D. C. W. D. N. Y., 1913).
19. Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72 N. E. 839 (1903); Fisher Flour
Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522
(1913).
20. 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041 (1912).
21. 220 U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. ed. 502 (1911).
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"I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit
by this court permitting knaves to cut prices for some ulte-
rior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not destroy,
the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to
be desirable that the public should be able to get."
It is to be noted that the Court clearly indicated that these con-
tracts might be validated by legislative sanction.22 The Miles
decision was followed with slight modifications, not only by later
federal holdings, but by states having anti-trust legislation.
However, in the absence of prohibitory legislation the state
courts have generally held resale price maintenance agreements
to be valid. 23
Various non-contractual price maintenance devices have also
been employed with varying degrees of success. One of the
earliest schemes was the rebate system whereby the manufac-
turer allowed a rebate to retailers who abstained from selling the
merchandise below the trade price fixed by him.24 Although the
court held that such arrangements were not in violation of the
anti-trust laws,2 5 this plan proved practically ineffective because
the dealer was not bound to maintain the price fixed by the manu-
facturer.2 Another plan frequently employed by the manufac-
turer was that of refusing to sell to price cutters. In United
States v. Colgate and Company27 this plan was held valid on the
ground that the inherent right of every individual to refuse to
deal with any person, for any reason, or for no reason whatever,
included the right to refuse to deal with one who does not main-
tain a designated resale price. For a time it was thought that
this decision had greatly modified the effect of the Miles case,28
but subsequent cases restricted its application to such an extent
that its effect was virtually nullified. Thus in Federal Trade
Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Company2 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that it was an "unfair method of com-
22. Supra, note 21, 1. c. 405: "Nor can the manufacturer by rule and
notice, in the absence of contract or statutory right, even though the
restriction be known to purchasers, fix prices for future sales."
23. Note, 30 Ill. Law Rev. 640 (1936); Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1. c. 813,
fns. 7-15 (1936).
24. Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885).
25. John D. Park and Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Assn.,
175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136, 62 L. R. A. 632 (1903).
26. 28 Advertising and Selling 24-5 (Jan. 1, 1937) ; Miller, The Mainte-
nance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 22.
27. 250 U. S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465, 63 L. ed. 992 (1919).
28. Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932)
68, fn. 5.
29. 257 U. S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150, 66 L. ed. 307, 19 A. L. R. 882 (1922).
a
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petition" within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission
Act of September 26, 1914, for a manufacturer to issue circulars
to his trade suggesting that they maintain resale prices fixed by
him, and to discontinue selling to any dealer who refused to com-
ply with his suggestion. Price maintenance was also attempted
under the so-called "agency" system, whereby the dealer was ap-
pointed the exclusive sales agent of the manufacturer who fixed
the resale price of the merchandise. Although this plan was sus-
tained by the courts where a bona fide agency relationship ex-
isted,80 it was declared invalid when used as a subterfuge in order
to get around the effect of the Miles decision.1
It appears, therefore, that two chief obstacles mitigated
against these varied attempts at resale price maintenance,
namely, the difficulties of administration and the anti-trust acts.
Although price cutting had direct effects on persons other than
the producer of the merchandise, the existing remedy could be
used only by the manufacturer, who was often reluctant to en-
danger the dealer's goodwill.3 2 Even if the manufacturer was
willing to risk the loss of the dealer's goodwill, he was frequently
unable to exercise supervision over the dealer adequate to in-
form him whether or not the price he had fixed was being main-
tained.33 As a matter of law the manufacturer was remediless
in all cases against persons other than those with whom he was
dealing.34 The Miles decision invalidated price maintenance con-
tracts affecting interstate commerce. Thereby the producer was
forced to rely on ineffective non-contractual devices in all cases
in which he shipped his goods across state lines.3
II.
As a result of the situation outlined above, advocates of resale
price maintenance took their cause to the legislatures. Attempts
at securing federal legislation were unsuccessful. Following the
decision in the Miles case, numerous bills were introduced in
Congress to legalize price maintenance contracts in interstate
30. Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218 Fed. 447 (C. C. A. N. Y.,
1914); Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 Fed. 280 (C. C. A. Tex., 1915).
31. For an analysis of the legal requirements of an agency so as to
enable the manufacturer to fix the resale price see Seligman and Love, Price
Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932) appendix three; see also Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co. 243 U. S. 490, 37 S. Ct. 412, 61 L. ed. 866
(1917).
32. 28 Adv. and Sell. 24-5 (Jan. 1, 1937).
33. Supra, note 29.
34. Supra, note 18.
35. Supra, note 32.
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commerce, but none of them was passed."" The most notable was
the Capper-Kelly Bill '7 which contained provisions similar to
those in the state Fair Trade Acts, although it did not contain the
compulsory features thereof. Under the code requirements of the
N.R.A. some attempt was made to provide for the control of
resale prices, but the courts were greatly influenced by the Miles
case, in interpreting the code provisions and hence the require-
ments were of little practical effect.35
Prior to 1913 the states either did not legislate at all on the
subject of resale price maintenance, or else passed statutes which
restricted or condemned the practice.8 9 In 1913, a New Jersey
statute was enacted4 and subsequently sustained, 41 which made
it unlawful for any merchant to cut prices on a trade-marked
product where the goods carried a notice prohibiting such prac-
tice. Thus, the Act obviated the necessity for proof of a contrac-
tual relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer. In
addition, the Act provided that recovery might be had not only
by the manufacturer, but also "by any other injured person,"
and so permitted persons other than the producer to bring actions
against the price cutter. These innovations unquestionably con-
tributed towards more effective price maintenance.
For almost twenty years the New Jersey act was the only
legislation which expressly sanctioned resale price maintenance.
In 1931, California enacted the first of the Fair Trade Acts. As
originally passed, it was merely a codification of the law that had
been laid down by the decisions in that state, and was not even
as broad as the New Jersey statute referred to previously.42 The
purpose of the statute, as stated in the Act was "to protect trade-
mark owners, distributors and the public against injurious and
36. 171 Printer's Ink 7 (June 27, 1935); Miller, The Maintenance of
Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 22.
37. 70th Congress, 1st Session; H. R. 11, Sen. 1418; see also 16 Advertis-
ing and Selling 1. c. 26 (Nov. 26, 1930).
38. Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade (1933) Art. VIII, IX,
sec. 1 (c); Katz Drug Co. v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 6 Fed. Supp. 193
(1933), aff'd 72 F. (2) 548 (C. C. A. 3, 1934). See Oppenheim, Cases on
Trade Regulation (1936) 905-908; Note, Resale Price Maintenance under
the N. R. A. Codes (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 1332.
39. Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932)
appendix three.
40. N. J. Comp. Stats. (1911-24) see. 255-1. The act was subsequently
amended, N. J. Laws (1916) c. 106.
41. Ingersoll and Bro. v. Hahne and Company, 89 N. J. Eq. 332, 108 At].
128 (1918).
42. Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)
395 (1909); D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041
(1912); Cal. Stat. (1931) p. 583.
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uneconomic practices in the distribution of articles of standard
quality under a distinguished trade brand or name." The Act
merely authorized the producer of trade-marked commodities,
which were in fair and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced by others, to provide in the sales
contract that the buyer would not resell such commodity except
at the price stipulated by the producer, and that the buyer would
require a similar contract from his vendee. The Act gave no
remedy against those not in privity of contract, nor did it allow
recovery by anyone other than the promisee, or the manufac-
turer. 3 In 1933 the California statute was amended so as to in-
clude these two features in cases involving the sale of commod-
ities included within the scope of the act. The amendment pro-
vides that the wilful selling of such commodities at less than the
price stipulated in a maintenance agreement is unfair competi-
tion and is actionable by any person damaged, regardless of
whether or not the person who cut prices is a party to the con-
tract.
4 4
Some sixteen states have followed the lead of California by
enacting similar statutes. At the present time fair trade bills
are pending before the legislatures in several other states, includ-
ing Missouri.45 Moreover, due to the impetus given by a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Old Dear-
born Distributing Company v. Seagram-Distillers Corporationw0
which sustained the Fair Trade Acts of Illinois and California,
these bills are almost certain of passing. It has been suggested
that by sustaining the Fair Trade Acts the Supreme Court has
gone in a complete circle in its holdings on this point, and that
it is merely returning to the principles that it adhered to in the
early cases which permitted price maintenance agreements.4 7
43. Supra, note 42. This purpose is also stated in virtually all of the
present Fair Trade Acts; see note 45 below.
44. Laws of Calif. (1933) c. 260.
45. Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. of 1935, c. 121M, sec. 188 et seq.; Iowa
Sess. Laws 1935, c. 106, sec. 1-6; Laws of Md. (1935), c. 212, sec. 106-9;
Laws of N. J. (1935), c. 58, sec. 1-6; Laws of N. Y. (1935), c. 976, sec. 1-6;
Ore. Laws (1935), c. 295, sec. 1-7; Laws of Pa. (1935), No. 155, sec. 1-6;
Laws of Wash. (1935), c. 177, sec. 1-7; Laws of Wisc. (1935), Ass. Bill
343; To the effect that Arizona, Ohio, Louisiana, and Rhode Island have
also recently passed similar acts see Business Week 13 (Dec. 12, 1936). See
also 40 Sales Management 400 (March 1, 1937); 40 Sales Management 24-5
(Ja. 1, 1937); A Missouri Fair Trade Bill is now before the state legisla-
ture, House Bill No. 118.
46. 40 Sales Management 400 (March 1, 1937); 40 Sales Management
202-2 (Feb. 1, 1937).
47. 28 Advertising and Selling 24-5 (Ja. 1, 1937).
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The Dearborn case, however, did not overrule the Miles case in
so far as the Miles case applied to contracts affecting goods in
interstate commerce, but simply upheld the validity of intrastate
contracts.4 8 Moreover, it appears that the court in the Dearborn
case sanctioned an extension of protection to the owner of trade-
marked merchandise. This protection formerly was denied to him
and given to the owner of patented and copyrighted articles.49
III.
Although the Fair Trade Acts mark an advance in the direc-
tion of resale price maintenance, they present some acute prob-
lems. The highest courts of three states have declared the acts
invalid5 ° This raises the first problem. However, one of these
states, New York, recently reversed itself,51 and in view of the
influence of the Dearborn case, similar action by the other two
states may well be expected. Another problem is the difficulty
that may be encountered with the federal anti-trust acts which,
as previously noted, have been held to prohibit resale price main-
tenance contracts which directly affect interstate commerce.52
Various schemes have been suggested as means of surmounting
this barrier. One suggestion is that in view of the recent favor-
able attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Dearborn case toward price maintenance contracts the court
might well be expected to overrule the Miles case. It might hold
that the effect on interstate commerce of the control of intra-
state retail sales by a foreign manufacturer would be too remote
to be violative of the Sherman Act, notwithstanding the feature
of interstate shipment3 Again, it has been suggested that the
manufacturer might incorporate in each state, ship the goods to
his own warehouse within the state, and then enter into contracts
with the dealers. Still another proposal is for the manufacturer
to "suggest" to the wholesalers within each state that after they
receive the goods they should require price maintenance con-
tracts from the dealers." The best solution to the problem, how-
ever, lies in the Tydings-Miller bill which is designed to validate
48. Supra, note 21.
49. Supra, note 10.
50. Business Week 24-25 (D. '19, 1936); 28 Adv. and Sell. 29-30 (D. 17,.
1936). New York, Wisconsin, and New Jersey prior to the decision in the
Old Dearborn case held the non-signers clause invalid as against both state
and federal constitutions.
51. Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Abraham Dorfuran, 141 Pub. Week. 1230
(March 13, 1937).
52. Supra, note 21.
53. Miller, The Fair Trade Act (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 50.
54. Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. 293 (1936).
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in interstate commerce such agreements and contracts as are
valid when applied intrastate. This bill recently was passed by
the Senate and is expected to receive favorable action by the
House in the present session.5 5
Various problems arise as to the type of contracts that may
be employed under the acts. In the first place it should be noted
that the scope of the acts is limited to vertical agreements, that
is, as between persons in successive market stages 6 The appli-
cation of the Acts does not extend to all classes of commodities,
nor even to all branded merchandise. It extends only to branded
commodities that are "in fair and open competition with com-
modities of the same general class produced by others. '5 7 Fur-
thermore, assuming that the product of a manufacturer is within
this class, it is still an open question whether it would be to his
interest to take advantage of the provisions of the Acts, for only
a limited type of merchandise is suitable to be used as a loss
leader. Thus if a particular brand is not in popular demand
there will be no inducement for the dealer to use it as 'bait' for
the consumer. Again, if the product is of such strong popular
demand that no dealer can afford to refuse to handle it, the man-
ufacturer is assured of unrestricted distribution regardless of
its use as a loss leader. It appears, therefore, that the brands
that will gain by the standardization of prices under the acts are
those that are strong enough to make them attractive as price
leaders, but not so dominant as to be considered independent of
the goodwill of the dealers.59 Moreover, in designating the resale
price it will be necessary for the manufacturer to consider fluc-
tuations in the market and the possibility of a decrease in the
demand for his product. Thus it appears that the contract fixing
55. Business Week 13 (Dec. 12, 1936); Comment, 31 Ill. Law Review
793 (1936); 80 Cong. Rec. 8433 (1936); 28 Adv. and Sell. 29-30 (D. 17,
1936).
56. "This Act shall not apply to any contract or agreement between pro-
ducers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or resale
prices;" sec. 3 of the acts. This section forbids the application of the act
to "horizontal" price-fixing agreements. See also Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S.
88, 9 S. Ct. 658, 33 L. ed. 67 (1889) ; Park and Sons Co. v. National Whole-
sale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136, 62 L. R. A. 632 (1903).
57. This provision is generally found in sec. 1 of the acts, supra, note 45.
58. 28 Advertising and Selling 24-25 (Ja. 1, 1937).
59. Ibid.; see also Oliphant, Cases on Trade Regulation (1936) 906;
Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932).
However, of course, the producer of merchandise that is not included in
the Fair Trade Acts may employ the means suggested supra, notes 29 to
32, to maintain resale prices, but it appears that the loss leader practice
is the chief problem in predatory price cutting; see article VIII, N. R. A.
Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade.
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the price should be flexible rather than rigid,60 and several differ-
ent types of contracts with varying provisions have been sug-
gested.61 The acts expressly provide that the provisions in any
contract shall be deemed to imply that the commodity may be
sold below the stipulated price in instances where the dealer is
closing out his stock, where the goods are damaged, or under
court order.6 2
As to the probable effect of the Fair Trade Acts and their de-
sirability from the standpoint of public interest there is consid-
erable disagreement. On the one hand it is contended that the
acts are directed against the chain stores where the loss leader
system is most frequently practiced, and that there will result
a "battle of brands" between the national brands handled by the
independent dealers, and the private brands that the chain stores
will be forced to market.6 3 On the other hand it is claimed that
the chains will profit by the Acts and have advocated their pas-
sage.64 It is argued further that the consumer will be forced to
pay higher prices because of the restricted competition;65 but
this argument is met by the proposition that fair prices will re-
sult because the stability of the system will make for economy. 6
Even the effect on the manufacturer has been the subject of dis-
pute.67 Thus, although the result of the acts remains to be seen,
they may fairly be said to be the latest attack on predatory price
cutting. They constitute a legislative attack upon the loss leader
system, which has been condemned by the public generally.
OLLm RIcHARD AInNS
60. Note, 36. Col. L. Rev. 293 (1936) ; 40 Sales Management 202-2 (Feb.
1, 1937).
61. Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. 293, fns. 67-85 (1936).
62. These provisions are generally found in section 2 of the Fair Trade
Acts, supra, note 45.
63. 40 Sales Management 400 (March 1, 1937).
64. 178 Printers Ink 100-2 (1937).
65. 28 Advertising and Selling 24-5 (Ja. 1, 1937); 23 Nation's Bus. 29-30
(Aug., 1935).
66. 127 Pub. Week. 136 (1935); 40 Sales Management 400 (March 1,
1937) ; 130 Pub. Week. 2281, 2283, 2296 (Dec. 12, 1936); Bus. Week 13-14
(Dec. 12, 1936) ; 171 Printer's Ink 7 (June 27, 1935).
67. Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. 293, fns. 12 and 13 (1936).
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